



European Coalition  
on Oil in Sudan (ECOS)

**DOCUMENTATION**

**ON**

**THE IMPACT OF OIL ON SUDAN**

29 May 2001

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MAP

1. From : ***Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission***  
*Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs*  
*Ottawa, January 2000*

“The preponderance of Southern opinion we encountered was that Oil was hurting their people. We tried hard to find out what people thought and felt, and tried hard to figure out just what is going on. Leonardo Franco’s predecessor as Special Rapporteur, Gaspar Biro, has been quoted as saying that if the oil companies don’t know what’s going on, they’re not looking over the fences of their compounds.

Of course, Talisman maintains that it keeps itself well-informed, and there is some reason to believe that this is so, at a certain level. However, we were often told, and saw for ourselves, that great reliance is placed on the GNPOC security staff for local information. If Talisman was really looking “over the fence”, what would its people have seen?

Certainly, there seem to be few, if any, Nuer or Dinka at work at Heglig, which seems to fit with a widely held view in Western Upper Nile that the GOS, thus GNPOC, views all non-Arabs as potential threats to security. Skilled workers are brought from the North; the unskilled are recruited, on an as needed basis, by the Arab overseers working for GNPOC, and they go to the Heglig Market for this purpose, a market where are gathered the Jallaba traders and the Bagarra nomads who have proliferated in the area since the time of Chevron. And all hires are scrutinized by Sudan Security. (...)

It was reported to us, in different places from widely different sources, that in August 1999, eight Nuer went to Heglig to seek work from GNPOC, and were killed for it. It would be interesting to read the Heglig security logs for this period, but it would not be a surprise to us if they contained little pertinent information. If Talisman is relying totally on GNPOC, read Northern Sudanese, security officials, for information about events which impact on the company’s reputation, it does not mean that it is meeting its responsibilities. (...)

It is certainly fair to acknowledge that the durable civil war in Sudan is not fundamentally about oil, but oil has become a key factor. The IGAD Declaration of Principles, cited in the October 26 policy statement, gives a clear account of the key issues—democracy, human rights, religion and state, and self-determination. But oil is now part of the war, and the Assessment Mission has had to ponder whether the current oil operations exacerbate this war, or advance the pursuit of peace.

The evidence we gathered, including the testimony of those directly involved directs us to conclude that oil is exacerbating conflict in Sudan. (p. 15)

(...) The underlying reality is that there has been, and probably still is, major displacement of civilian populations related to oil extraction. Furthermore, Oil has become a major focus of the fighting. Worse, the oil operations in GOS-controlled territory are used, even if to a limited extent, and possibly without the knowledge or approval of the oil companies, to directly support GOS military operations. (...) We can only conclude that Sudan is a place of extraordinary suffering and continuing human rights violations, even though some forward progress can be recorded, and the oil operations in which a Canadian company is involved add more suffering.”  
(...) (p16)

2. From : ***Situation of human rights in the Sudan, Summary of the draft report of the Special Rapporteur***

*Commission on Human Rights*

*Fifty-sixth session*

*Agenda item 9*

*E/CN.4/2000/36*

*(Geneva, 19 April 2000).*

15. The Special Rapporteur is of the view that the prolonged war in the Sudan mainly affects the civilian population, whose plight should be regarded as one of the most important human rights concerns facing the international community. Although of rather low intensity, the war has a disproportionately high impact on the civilian population, in particular women and children, who become hostages or targets of the belligerents. Consistent and undisputed evidence indicates that the war is being conducted in disregard of human rights and humanitarian law principles, and that violations are perpetrated by all parties, albeit with varying degrees of responsibility, the greater portion being attributable to the Government.

17. The Special Rapporteur has found that the Government is continuing to practise indiscriminate bombing, which appears to have intensified during recent weeks, with a heavy toll of civilians. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur strongly condemns the bombing of the school at Kaouda in the Nuba Mountains, as well as the heinous practice of bombing civilians as they gather to collect humanitarian food aid, mainly in the Upper Nile zone.

18. He also regrets that the Government has forced civilians of ethnic Nuer populations to relocate, with the purpose of ensuring military control of oil industry operations in Upper Nile. According to consistent reports, this practice is allegedly followed by the settlement of ethnic Baggaara groups.

19. The Special Rapporteur expresses concern at the use of oil industry airstrips for military purposes and at the practice of seriously hindering humanitarian assistance, particularly in western Upper Nile, mainly by restricting access by air to many humanitarian distribution sites, as well as by imposing flight bans on certain occasions.

21. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur is convinced that the oil issue, in western Upper Nile, lies at the heart of the conflict and believes that it is not fair for the civilian population to be once again the most affected target in this scenario. Oil exploitation has resulted in the exacerbation of the war. The Special Rapporteur believes that, as idealistic as this may seem in the present circumstances, any solution will have to be based on a wide consensus of all affected parties. He also believes that, as a matter of urgency, steps should be taken to address the current situation. In this connection, he recommends that unhindered humanitarian access be granted to the areas of concern. He also recommends that all efforts be made to facilitate the return of displaced people to their areas of origin. He further recommends that the use of oil facilities for military purposes come to an end. (...)

3. From : ***World Report 2000***  
*Human Rights Watch*  
*Washington, 2001*

“The government of Sudan remained a gross human rights abuser, while rebel groups committed their share of violations. In the seemingly endless seventeen-year civil war, the government stepped up its brutal expulsions of southern villagers from the oil production areas and trumpeted its resolve to use the oil income for more weapons. Under the leadership of President (Lt. Gen.) Omar El Bashir, the government intensified its bombing of civilian targets in the war, denied relief food to needy civilians, and abused children’s rights, particularly through its military and logistical support for the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which held an estimated 6,000 Ugandan children captive on government-controlled Sudanese territory. As for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the principal armed movement of the south and of all Sudan, its forces continued to loot food (including relief provisions) from the population, sometimes with civilian casualties, recruit child soldiers, and commit rape. On both sides, impunity was the rule. (...)”

Negotiations to end the war appeared fruitless, whatever the forum or venue. The parties remained stalled on the issues of the relation of religion to the state and self-determination. Sudan’s Arab and African, Muslim and non-Muslim population is spread between nineteen major ethnic groups and 597 subgroups speaking Arabic and more than 115 indigenous languages. (...)”

Fighting spread further into the southern area of Western Upper Nile, inhabited mainly by the African Nuer. The government continued its campaign of creating a cordon sanitaire around new oil fields by forcibly displacing the Nuer population. In addition to aerial bombardment and scorched-earth attacks by government troops, the government armed Nuer proxies to fight against anti-government Nuer. The government routinely banned U.N. relief aircraft from Western Upper Nile on security grounds, although its military campaigns produced tens of thousands of freshly displaced civilians, who were burned and looted out of their homes by pro-government Nuer militia and the government army.

The warlord syndrome, where human rights were rarely recognized by the local toughs, spread in Upper Nile wherever local commanders could secure direct government funding and arms, serving as government militias. (...)”

The government announced that its new oil revenue, constituting 20 percent of its 2000 revenue, would be used for defense, including an arms factory near Khartoum. Defense spending in dollars increased 96 percent from 1998 to 2000. Not coincidentally, government use of air power and bombing increased. (...)”

The government also armed tribal militias of the Arabized Baggara tribes (the murahleen of Western Sudan) for use as proxy fighting forces against the Dinka civilian base of the SPLA in Bahr El Ghazal. Although slave-taking became their trademark, the murahleen conducted few successful slave raids in 2000 because the SPLA deployed forces in northern Bahr El Ghazal and armed the Dinka boys guarding the cattle camps. Even so, the government continued to use the murahleen to guard the military train to Wau, from which they attacked villages and looted cattle and food.”

4. From : ***The Scorched Earth, Oil and war in Sudan***  
*by Christian Aid*  
*London, March 2001*

“When the pumping began, the war began... Oil has brought death.”  
**Chief Malony Kolang, Western Upper Nile**

“In the oilfields of Sudan, civilians are being killed and raped, their villages burnt to the ground. They are caught in a war for oil, part of the wider civil war between northern and southern Sudan that has been waged for decades. Since large-scale production began two years ago, oil has moved the war into a new league. Across the oil-rich regions of Sudan, the government is pursuing a ‘scorched earth’ policy to clear the land of civilians and to make way for the exploration and exploitation of oil by foreign oil companies.

This Christian Aid report, *The Scorched Earth*, shows how the presence of international oil companies is fuelling the war. Companies from Asia and the West, including the UK, have helped build Sudan’s oil industry, offering finance, technological expertise and supplies, to create a strong and growing oil industry in the centre of the country. In the name of oil, government forces and government-supported militias are emptying the land of civilians, killing and displacing hundreds of thousands of southern Sudanese. Oil industry infrastructure—the same roads and airstrips which serve the companies—is used by the army as part of the war. In retaliation, opposition forces have attacked government-controlled towns and villages, causing further death and displacement. Exports of Sudan’s estimated reserves of two billion barrels of oil are paying for the build-up of a Sudanese homegrown arms industry as well as paying for more arms imports. Without oil, the civil war being fought between the government of Sudan and the main opposition force, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is at a stalemate; with oil, it can only escalate.

The Sudanese government itself now admits that oil is funding the wider civil war. ‘Sudan will be capable of producing all the weapons it needs thanks to the growing oil industry,’ announced General Mohamed Yassin just eleven months after the oil began flowing out of the new pipeline into the supertankers at the Red Sea port. The government now earns roughly US\$1 million a day from oil – equivalent to the US\$1 million it spends daily fighting the war. The equation is simple, the consequences devastating. Christian Aid visited southern Sudan last year to gather first-hand information about the impact of the companies’ involvement. Eyewitness accounts show that government forces are ruthlessly clearing the way for oil over an ever-larger area. In one area of Eastern Upper Nile where a new consortium began prospecting in March 2001, 48 villages have been burned and 55,000 people displaced in the past 12 months. Along a new road in one European oil company’s concession, said one eyewitness, ‘there is not a single village left’.

In a war against the SPLA, virtually all southerners—the ordinary people who have always lived in the oil-rich areas of Western Upper Nile—are regarded as potential enemies. For them, the legacy of the oil beneath their feet has not been new schools and roads, but displacement, destruction and death. The SPLA opposition is targeting the oil installations and fighting government forces. It is civilians who are dying from the abuses perpetrated by both sides.

Western Upper Nile now has the highest proportion of people in need anywhere in Sudan. Its children are at the highest nutritional risk. Common Article 3 of the Geneva



Conventions, which includes the protection of civilians during war, is being violated each and every day. Organisations such as Christian Aid and its 24 local partner organisations cannot fulfil their humanitarian mandate. Aid flights are banned by the government, leaving people in even greater need.

Extracting oil in a country at war with itself is, without question, problematic. In Sudan, geography compounds the problem. Although the oil is being exploited by the government, most oil reserves lie in southern Sudan – in areas where the SPLA and other southern groups are fighting against the government in pursuance of demands for a more equitable share of economic and political power. The oil is transported north through a 1,600 km pipeline built with foreign hardware, including British pumping stations and engines. Khartoum has signalled its intentions by selling oil concessions across the entire south as far as the Ugandan border. These are the areas next in line for armed clearance. (p. 1)

(...) Military protection is also part of the partnership. As in many conflict-ridden countries, the oil companies are themselves targets. The SPLA has declared oilfields and oil companies to be legitimate military targets; one of its local commander has attacked oil installations.

The companies require protection so that they may operate unhindered and so their staff are secure. But the relationship between oil and security has moved far beyond simple defence. A strategy of clearing potential enemies – Nuer and Dinka civilians – from the oilfields is seen by the government as a prerequisite to making way for oil.

As companies cast their eyes on the prize – huge reservoirs of untapped oil deep inside SPLA-held territory – the oil war promises to spread. TotalFinaElf's 120,000 km<sup>2</sup> concession near the town of Bor cannot be exploited unless the area is controlled by the northern government. There is nothing to suggest that the government will not practice its scorched earth policy here, too. (...)

Yet, despite the evidence, the oil companies remain largely silent. Those directly engaged in production claim that they have no knowledge of oil-related human rights violations on their land – that, however deplorable, human rights violations are not linked to their activities or to their need for government-supplied security. (...) The companies say that they will help bring peace and prosperity to Sudan. But there are signs neither of peace nor of prosperity – only of more war.” (p. 2)

5. From: ***Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000, Sudan Operations***  
*Talisman Energy Inc.*  
*Calgary, April 2001*

“There have been many media and third-party reports of population displacement in oil field areas. We are aware that historically there has been conflict and strife in the 19,000 square mile concession are amongst Baggara, Dinka and Nuer groups and militias sometimes aligned with the government, sometimes not. Conflict still periodically occurs within the GNPOC concession. We believe that all persons whose land use has been impacted by GNOPC operations in the concession and along the pipeline should receive fair and just compensation. In the concession area, GNPOC has compensated people affected by GNPOC operations, such as drilling wells and seismic exploration activity. However, the process of identifying people affected by such activity and the provision of fair compensation has not been well documented.” (p. 17)

“The main problems in the oilfield area is the forced movement of populations. Access to grazing land is a good example. For the security of oil operations, trees are fallen and grass is regularly burnt in oil concessions. Therefore, pasture for cattle has drastically reduced. The original inhabitants of the area are pastoralists. If they (do not) have access to grazing lands, their food security is at threat and they are forced to leave. Building a clinic or a water tower will never balance forced movements of populations. Development work is coming too late if the population has been forced to move” *International NGO, Khartoum.* (p. 15)

“Seven documented cases have been investigated through the [human rights monitoring and investigation] program in 2000. Records are maintained for each case. These cases include investigations of physical violence against workers, verbal abuse and dismissal from work.” (p. 18)

“There is a lot of manpower coming from the North to work in Heglig and on the infrastructure projects so local people are not benefitting from the oil through local employment.” *Former politician from Bentiu.* (p. 32)

“Oil is very important for the Government of Sudan that Talisman is responsible for seeing that the operations of GNOPC are carried out while maintaining social justice, equal opportunities, et. It is out of place for Talisman to look at the situation outside its sphere of influence. Talisman’s concerns is only in the area where it operates.” *Senior official of the Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining* (p. 17)

“However, the use of oilfield infrastructure for non-defensive military purposes is of great concern to Talisman” (p. 15)

“As disclosed in Talisman’s 2000 Annual Report, the Government of Sudan’s entitlement from Talisman’s share of production in the year 2000 was valued by Talisman (on an accrued basis) to be \$306,100,000 [in Canadian dollars, the USD equivalent is \$204,138 090].” (p. 28)

“We believe that oil development is benefitting the people of Sudan. However, other organizations have expressed deep concern that oil revenues received by the Government of Sudan are contributing to the continuation of the ongoing war. We share this concern.” (p. 28)

6. From : ***Report of an Investigation into Oil Development, Conflict and Displacement in Western Upper Nile, Sudan, Preliminary Statement***

*Georgette Gagnon and John Ryle*

*May 2001*

“The economy of Western Upper Nile is based on livestock herding, agriculture and fishing. The majority of the indigenous inhabitants are from non-Arab, non-Muslim ethnic groups - the Nuer and the Dinka. It is an economy based on seasonal movement back and forth between permanent villages and cattle camps. The few towns in the area function as administrative posts for the Sudan government and as market centres. During most of the past fifteen years in Western Upper Nile, the armed forces of the government have been confined to garrison towns and to roads leading from those towns to the north. The government’s military strategy during the greater part of this period has been to support proxy forces - Baggara Arab militias from the north and pro-government Nuer groups within the south. These militias have been encouraged to attack and loot Nuer and Dinka settlements and cattle camps, driving their inhabitants further south or into government garrison towns or to the government-controlled north of the country.

For a short period in the late 1990s, a peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SSIM/A allowed for the extension of government authority into some of the rural areas of the concession, enabling expansion of oil development and completion of a pipeline from the oil fields north to Port Sudan. The collapse of this peace agreement in 1999 and the return of SSIM/A forces to their bases in non-government areas prompted an alteration in the Sudan government’s military strategy. The new strategy in Western Upper Nile is both more violent and more territorially focussed, involving coordinated attacks on civilian settlements in which aerial bombardment and raids by helicopter gunships are followed by ground attacks from government-backed militias and government troops. These ground forces burn villages and crops, loot livestock and kill and abduct men, women and children. (...)

The investigators obtained eyewitness accounts from people attacked by gunships in non-government controlled areas of the concession throughout 2000 and 2001. Eyewitnesses identified flight patterns of the attacking helicopters that indicated they came from and returned to Heglig and other oil fields in the concession.

The incidence of other human rights violations in and around the concession escalated in 2000 and early 2001. The investigation documented a wide range of abuses connected with forced displacement of people. Defecting soldiers from the Sudan government’s military base at Heglig testified that they had been ordered to participate in ground attacks on non-government controlled villages around Pariang, a government-controlled town in the concession, in order to force the inhabitants out of the area. The soldiers testified that they had been instructed to kill civilians and any persons not loyal to the Government of Sudan. This, they stated, was for the purpose of securing the oil fields for development.

There were also incidents of attacks on settlements by armed groups aligned with the SPLA/M and by those aligned with the SPDF (formerly the SSIM/A). There were three recorded attacks in 2000 and 2001 on oil installations or infrastructure by rebel forces in Western Upper Nile. (...)

The investigators found no evidence that significant economic or other benefits from oil development are accruing to indigenous communities in Western Upper Nile and no sign that the Government of Sudan is using oil revenues to assist the civilian population in Talisman's concession, or in Southern Sudan in general. (...)

The investigation found that Southern Sudanese in their early teens have been forcibly conscripted into Sudan government armed forces and trained at a military camp near Heglig, and are currently providing security in areas of oil development. (...)

The continuing process of displacement has repeatedly interrupted the agricultural cycle in Western Upper Nile and reduced livestock numbers, bringing the area's inhabitants close to starvation. (...)

Conflict between the two rebel movements operating in Western Upper Nile and between those rebel movements and government-backed militias has continued to be an important cause of disruption of the lives of the civilian inhabitants of the area. But direct military action by government forces, in conjunction with pro-government militias, is now a key factor in the forced displacement of people in Western Upper Nile."

7. from: *Depopulating Sudan's Oil Regions, January to March 2002*, Diane deGuzman, edited by Egbert G.Ch. Wesselink (May 2002).

## KEY FINDINGS

1. In October 2001, the Government of the Sudan launched an offensive in the Southeast part of Ruweng County, in oil concession Block 2. It attacked the villages between Jukabar and Bal from the air and with ground troops. There were no SPLA contingents in the targeted villages and the Government troops did not encounter any armed resistance during their operations. The indigenous population of the region was forced to flee. Those who survived the attack now huddle in two areas of swampland in the Northeast and Southeast corners of their County.
2. Within a month after the depopulation of the Jukabar/Bal area in Ruweng county, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC: Talisman Energy, Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, Petronas Carigali, and Sudapet) moved a drilling rig into Pakier, just West of this area. The timing of GNPOC's activity suggests that these attacks were designed to clear the way for an expansion of the oil production in the region
3. By mid-February 2002, the Northern part of Block 5A, Western Upper Nile, had been depopulated by Government troops. The Government of the Sudan claims that the purpose of its offensive was to rid the area of SPLA forces, but all available evidence shows that the civilian population was expressly targeted in an extended area along the road from the oil site at Rier and Southwards.
4. The war in the Sudan displaced millions before the oil exploitation started. However, the pattern of depopulation in Ruweng County– helicopter gunship attacks on villages, followed by murderous raids by regular Government troops and Government sponsored militias characterized by looting, torching of the huts, and finally the mining of the empty villages, cattle feed-drop sites and herding paths – are new in this war. The tactics are used effectively to deter the displaced from returning to their villages. The resulting vast empty regions, support the allegation that the Government of the Sudan is knowingly and deliberately depopulating this oil-rich area in order to make it secure for the oil business.
5. The violent depopulation in Western Upper Nile is part of a war for control of the oil-rich areas. After the SPLA-SPDF united early in 2002, they attacked Government convoys and declared the oil operations to be a valid military target, which did not fail to escalate the war. The Government immediately retaliated against the SPLA-SPDF. Villages were deliberately targeted and civilians killed. An estimated 50.000 civilians have been forced to flee.
6. Much of the fighting against rebel forces and civilians is carried out by Government sponsored militias. Interviews with recent defectors from one of these proxy militias show that they are instructed to systematically kill and displace civilians.
7. An estimated 80,000 people from Ruweng County, and another 50.000 from Western Upper Nile are currently on the move in search of safety, food and shelter. Many of them are threatened by acute food shortages. The Government of Sudan's ban on flights carrying in

food and medical assistance jeopardizes the lives of tens of thousands of people and contributes to the depopulation of the oil-rich areas.

8. The war in Ruweng County and Western Upper Nile is poorly reported. The vast region is difficult to access and the only international presence is that of rare NGO staff. Much of what goes on within the area remains unknown to the outside world. The Sudanese Government's ban on flight aid for large parts of Ruweng County and Western Upper Nile exacerbates the problem.

9. Oil revenues have flowed into the coffers of Sudan's state budget. Military expenditures have more than doubled, enabling the armed forces to acquire new weaponry such as M-24 'Hind' gunship helicopters. These have changed the military balance in Southern Sudan and are instrumental in clearing the oil regions of its population.

10. Both the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) and the Lundin Petroleum/OMV/Petronas Carigali/Sudapet consortium claim they have brought development projects to the local people. However, none of the displaced that interviewed were aware of any of the companies' "social investment" activities. Although one of the oil business's contributions made by the Lundin Petroleum-led consortium for the development of the region was the building of a bridge over the Bahr el Ghazal River, the bridge's only tangible impact on the well-being of the local communities has been to enable Baggara horsemen and mechanized Government forces to access the area, and to kill, rape and chase away the people. (The Baggara are a pastoral people from northern Sudan, who now serve the Government as a para-military force.)

11. The fact that the SPLA/SPDF have declared the oil operations military targets and that the Government of the Sudan targets oil-rich regions for depopulation, contradicts the oil companies' claims that the war is unconnected to their activities. On the contrary, it supports the conviction among the local population that the depopulation of Ruweng County and Western Upper Nile is meant to secure the oil-rich terrain.

12. Despite abundant documentation and international condemnation concerning the suffering that the war in the oil regions is inflicting on the population, and the absence of any agreement between the Government and the GNPOC governing the provision of security in the oilfield area, the consortium continues to accept that its security is provided for by a Government that depopulates huge areas of land of its indigenous population. Lundin Petroleum and OMV have expressed their wish to return to work as soon as security requirements are met. But none of the oil companies have set any conditions as to the well-being, protection, and the right of return by the people on whose lands they operate.

8. from: *Violence, Health and Access to Aid in Unity State/ Western Upper Nile, Sudan*. Médecins Sans Frontières. (April 2002)

## SUMMARY

Since the resumption of the civil war in Sudan in 1983, life in western Upper Nile has been a struggle for survival. For civilians, the war has brought little but misery, particularly since the escalation of the conflict in 1997. Repeated food shortages, displacement and epidemics have been commonplace.

*The health consequences of the war are enormous.* Repeated displacement strains coping mechanisms and the loss of cattle drives people into destitution. When these factors are coupled with lack of access to health care and an environment replete with infectious diseases, the result can be deadly. *Over 100,000 people are known to have died from one disease alone – kala azar (visceral leishmaniasis).* Additional mortality from violence, from other diseases such as tuberculosis, and from malnutrition is likely in the tens of thousands.

*With the intensification of the conflict since 1997, military and militia groups on all sides of the conflict have frequently targeted civilians and civilian objects in western Upper Nile.* The scale of the violence is shocking. Types of abuses perpetrated by armed groups include:

- Killings, assault, rape and forced recruitment of civilians by ground troops from all sides.
- Looting and theft of civilian property: homes have been burned, belongings looted, crops destroyed, and cattle stolen by ground troops from various armed factions including the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the militias allied to the Government of Sudan.
- Bombings and burnings of civilian homes and forced displacement in Panarou and in the vicinity of the new oil road by Government of Sudan forces using aerial bombardment, helicopter gunships, and ground troops.

*Access to relief has been minimal, and extremely limited in the past few years due to the escalation of the conflict.* Even before 1997, civilians in western Upper Nile had minimal access to humanitarian relief. MSF was one of a handful of agencies on the ground providing vital, albeit limited, health care. Thousands of lives were saved between 1988 and 1997. Nonetheless some areas such as Panarou have remained inaccessible since the war began, with fearful consequences for the population.

The total mortality from violence, disease and hunger in western Upper Nile will never be known. What is clear is that the war in western Upper Nile is slowly and inexorably killing off the people of the area.

9. from: *Statement* by Mr. Gerhart Baum, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Commission on Human Rights, 58th session. (28 March 2002)

## **VI. Human rights and humanitarian law**

Regarding human rights and humanitarian law in the context of the conflict, all information received point to the situation in Upper Nile as a major source of concern, partly as a consequence of the cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains which led both the Government and the SPLM/A to re-deploy their troops in the oil-rich region, thus contributing to an intensification of hostilities. Hence the need to have an internationally monitored cease-fire. It should be noted that the Nuba Mountains Cease-fire Agreement specifically refers to "attempts to occupy new ground positions and movement of troops and resources from one location to another" (Art. II.3.c), and states that "once the cease-fire has become effective, neither of the parties shall engage in movement or redeployment of forces resulting in tactical or strategic advantage" (Art. IV.3) .

In addition to reports focusing on the situation in Western Upper Nile, I was also informed that 21 villages have reportedly been burnt down by Government-allied militias on 11 February 2002 in Melud, Adariel area, Northern Upper Nile, in the vicinity of the Chinese concession.

Allied militias from both sides continued to cause widespread insecurity, making no difference between military and civilian targets and often resorting to recruitment of child soldiers. Their actions continued to go unaccounted for and served both parties' purpose to avoid exposing their troops while maintaining confusion regarding the situation on the ground, an element of instability, which disturbs relief services provided by international and local organizations. Access for humanitarian aid has continued to be difficult and flight clearances remain at times confusing, thus allowing for mishaps to take place. The number of denied locations has reportedly increased with up to 45 destinations denied in Upper Nile at the beginning of this month, by the Government. On the other hand, I continued to receive reports of forced recruitment and food-aid diversion, involving the SPLM/A and the SPDF. The leaders of the SPLM/A and SPDF, respectively John Garang de Mabior and Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, on 5-6 January 2002 agreed to an immediate merger of the two Movements under the name of SPLM/SPLA, thus integrating their military forces, political structures and governance systems. (Nairobi Declaration of Unity between the SPLM/SPLA and the SPDF). This development should be read in conjunction with the fact that the SPDF – and notably the Nuer areas under its control - used to be a buffer zone in the region of the oilfields. I was informed however, that the new unity within the rebel movement has limited practical effects on the ground, where local commanders are often heading splinter groups allied with shifting, local militias. Also, I continued to receive consistent reports indicating that Garang's authority is disputed and that there is some opposition within the Movement regarding his authoritarian leadership. As a result, the plight of civilians remains of serious concern and displacement has continued unabated.

The intensification of fighting in Western Upper Nile has led some sources to confirm reports received referring to scorched earth tactics aiming at creating a buffer zone in the oil-producing areas. Access remains difficult and detailed information is therefore scarce. International organizations highlighted their humanitarian concerns together with the underlying issue of protection of civilians and strongly advocated for a temporary ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in the area. It should be noted that the Government itself has repeatedly proposed the



establishment of a comprehensive cease-fire and, more recently, the extension of the cease-fire to Western Upper Nile. On the other hand, the SPLM/A has continued to reject any ceasefire that is not linked to serious talks and other conditions, because it fears that an unconditional cease-fire would allow the Government to step up oil production and increase arm purchase with impunity.

## 10. LIST OF INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THE SUDANESE OIL INDUSTRY

- *BP* (UK), a major investor in PetroChina, a subsidiary of CNPC. There is nothing to stop this investment being used to fund CNPC operations in Sudan.
- *China National Petroleum Company (CNPC)* (China), holds 40% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), which exploits block 1, 2 and 4 and owns the 1.600 km pipeline to the Red Sea; CNPC exploits concession 3 together with Gulf Petroleum Corporation. CNPC also holds the concession of the huge block 6.
- *ExxonMobil* (USA), downstream operations only. Sells i.a. aviation fuel at Khartoum and Port Sudan airports, overseen by its European headquarters in London. Holds an interest in airport installations which are allegedly used to fuel the Sudanese airforce.
- *Gulf Petroleum Corporation* (Qatar), exploits block 3, together with CNPC.
- *Lundin Oil AB* (Sweden/Switzerland), lead operator in block 5a, holding 40%.
- *OMV Aktiengesellschaft* (Austria), holds a 28% share in block 5a.
- *Petronas* (Malaysia), holds a 30% share in GNPOC and a 28.5% stake in block 5a.
- *Rolls Royce* (UK), supplies GNPOC with equipment and operational support.
- *Royal Dutch/Shell* (Netherlands/UK), downstream operations only. Sells aviation fuel to the Sudanese airforce. Promised on 17 May 2001 to end this activity.
- *Saras* (Italy), buys Nile Blend crude for its refinery in Sardinia.
- *Siemens* (Germany), telecommunication systems supplier to GNPOC.
- *Talisman Energy Inc* (Canada/Switzerland/Netherlands), lead operator and 25% owner of GNPOC through its Dutch subsidiary Talisman Greater Nile B.V., Amsterdam. Main office in Geneva.
- *TotalElfina* (France/Belgium), holds the 120.000 km<sup>2</sup> concession block 5; trades Sudan Nile Blend crude through its Geneva-based trading organization.
- *Trafigura* (Netherlands/UK/Switzerland), trades Sudan Nile Blend crude on behalf of Talisman. Legal headquarters in the Netherlands; does Nile Blend trading mostly through its main office in London.
- *Weir Pumps Ltd.* (UK), supplier of pumping stations and drivers to the Sudanese oil industry.



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